Why we should confront radicals, not silence them
There has been a sharp rise in radical groups in Europe over the past 5 years leading up to 2017 according to a Europol report on the state and trends of terrorism (TE-SAT report 2017). We often associate right wing, jihadist and paramilitary groups with the term extremism, but the report highlights that of the 205 potential and successful plots throughout Europe only 20 were classified as right wing and 33 jihadist whereas 24 were classified as left wing, and 137 separatist. 4 of these successful far-right attacks took place in Britain representing a disproportionate amount compared to other EU nations. Furthermore, the UK had a disproportionately high number of terror related deaths from attacks organised across the spectrum of extremist groups resulting in the UK showing the 10th greatest annual increase in deaths from terrorism between 2016–2017 (Global terrorism index 2018).
Before a mob comes a crowd, as radicalism comes before extremism, and an opportunity to nip violence in the bud (Christmann, 2012). The question is are we currently doing this in the best way we can? Across any form of parametric measurement of the political spectrum people resort to radical ideologies when they are disenfranchised with leadership (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010), recently in the UK, exhaustively, Brexit has been the most significant factor associated with these rises in radical alternatives.
Movements from reaches of the political spectrum are gaining traction, farage has launched his new Brexit party and Gerard Batten fills the empty grave of leadership Nigel Farage left in UKIP. On the left the alternative media source Novara media proposes an anti-Brexit luxury communism alternative to current political proceedings, furthermore the internal labour party lobby group momentum overtook green party in paid membership reaching 40,000 members in 2018, showing an increase of 15% (Independent.co.uk 2018). Non-violent radical groups are healthy for political discourse in that they criticise the shortcomings of mainstream opinions (Modan, 2008) leading to better strategic decisions being made (Olson, Parayitam & Bao, 2007). When their social interaction is limited to their own homogenous social groups they become more attached to the norms and values underpinning group membership and goals (Guimond, 2000; Gatto et al, 2009) leading them to internalise membership as personal identity (Moreland & Levine, 2001; Harris, Gringart & drake, 2014). Progressively they become more passionate about ensuring the goals of their group are achieved to benefit themselves and their in group (Lynch, 2013).
If they feel as though institutional bodies are not recognising or contributing toward their efforts to achieve group goals and become deprived of social engagement with alternative groups, they socialise and radicalise one another to such an extremity that they believe violence is the only legitimate means to achieve their group goals (Thomas, McGarthy & Louis, 2013).
This being the case we need to confront radical groups rather than let them multiply and fester in their hives until they become extremists, if we continue to snuff their presence in public spaces, as we have, we cannot achieve this. Allowing them free movement amongst public platforms has its issues as they can freely present propaganda to recruit people, likewise, offering a seat at the table to groups that wish to only incite hate could legitimise their views and unite fragmented individuals into an organised network. Censorship is therefore the best solution to tackle one sided presentations of a violent movement’s propaganda. If, however, we invite these beasts out of the shadows, into the light and shoulder the task of facing them on a two-way platform to debate and discuss them it gives us an opportunity to better understand them.
Inviting spokespersons into a legitimate platform will fulfil their need for acknowledgement and to participate in meaningful processes (Carver et al, 2001), preventing them from coming to believe violent extremism is a viable alternative (Thomas, McGarthy & Louis 2014). It also allows us a means of publicly demonstrating an opposing argument to expose logical flaws in their ideology and ridicule them. Presenting a group in a position of an enemy can have advantages to ourselves also, it tell us what we are not and unifies us around a set of guiding values that opposes dangerous ideologies (Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 2010). This may not persuade the core members of the groups, perhaps even embolden them (Sonn & Fischer, 2003) but the majority of members in these emerging movements are marginally invested with genuine concerns that the group addresses who are gradually coerced into violence by intelligent, charismatic leaders (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2010) and are ignorant of their diabolical intentions. It is dangerous to dismiss radical movements as harmless or too foolish to pose a serious threat because of this.
These marginal members can still be persuaded away from their ideological groups if they are dignified by and integrated into another (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). A unified opposition which intellectually crucifies radical leaders would create a mainstream environment which undermines and challenges marginal group members’ belonging to their groups, thus weakening the numbers of these movements by offering a perceivably superior, celebrated majority (Harris, 2015; Devine, 2015).
Why then are more and more media platforms and individuals choosing to silence rather than challenge these movements? Our emotions drive how we react to stimuli; moral judgements are rarely based on reason, but on intuition (Haidt, 2012). We justify our emotional arousal to stimuli with cognitive reasoning after the event we experience (Avramova & Inbar, 2013). When presented with ideologies that conflict with our own the physiological reaction is one of disgust (Graham, Meindl & Beall, 2012) and is comparable to the response of a physical threat, such as a predator (Schnall et al, 2008). Biologically our bodies are prepared to destroy what we’ve encountered, then our minds attempt to justify this urge in line with the environment it’s presented with (Pessoa, 2010). Censorship is the most opportune means of tackling the ‘predator’ through a digital platform (Boyd et al 2003). If the problem isn’t present, it doesn’t exist, it doesn’t threaten me, I have overcome it and I’m free of the stress it causes me, most importantly I feel the punishment of these group members was a noble act (Pereira & Prooijen, 2018).
Intuitively I agree this approach feels best, but it appears self-serving in that it fulfils our own sense of justice. It may even be that we have evolved to act punitively as third-party arbitrators even when we are not directly targeted by the persecution of a given group just for the positive emotions it elicits (Neilssen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Boyd et al, 2003). We need to consider the unforeseen implications of censoring these groups from our lives, actively censoring radical groups actualises the common ‘oppressed truth bringer’ narrative many use to embolden their group belonging (Sofka, 2018). It also legitimises their concerns for protecting free speech they often use to mask the espousal of hate speech which would become a threat to all of our expression.
We need to ask ourselves: what outcome do we want? Do we want to extinguish or address the ideas held by radical groups before they become harmful and attempt to reintegrate them into society? Or do we want to punish them with the bear minimum effort to deceive us into thinking we’re virtuously leading the charge against the enemy? Censorship only allows for one possibility.
It may seem hypocritical to suggest that inviting ringleaders to participate in a broadcast debate would result in the kind of calm discussion required to allow for persuasion after highlighting our emotional basis for making moral judgements. Anger begets anger in these scenarios and those invested in protecting a minority position are already more likely to respond emotionally (Sanchez-Mazas, 2018). Furthermore, in a commodified media environment where emotionally valent material attracts more viewers for longer (Hargrave & livingstone, 2009) would outlets want to broadcast a debate format without emotional conflict?
That is not to say that this psychological Colosseum is to no end, as previously mentioned there is value to having enemies and destroying them, could effective results not be achieved through emotional rather than rational means? Televised debates and social media feeds could become altars wherein ritual sacrifice against opponents of civil thought take place. This public group exorcism could fulfil the needs of mob justice that are currently taking place on social media through cancel and callout culture in a more constructive fashion.
A method of confrontation which allows for discourse and two-way discussion is one where both groups have an influence on one another and gain insight into the logical constructions of each other’s’ ideology. It’s important to achieve this knowledge of groups’ narratives and perspectives on current issues if we are to accurately understand, dismantle and prevent their numbers growing. Even if on an equal platform this isn’t achieved, and debate descends into emotionality the outcome still damages radicals and benefits the majority. It is not to say that inviting radicals into the public eye is without dangers or that there are no limits to the views that should be allowed exposure, hate speech is hate speech, but whilst It can be difficult to confront and just as nourishing to ignore the enemy we must if we are to stop them from progressing into action, not just words.
Why are we so afraid to formally debunk and ridicule those who we believe are so ideologically misguided and inferior when we do it so often amongst friends and within social media? Do we think ourselves above them? Are we too disgusted? Do we truly want to deal with them? or are we afraid we may find compromise with them rather than an opportunity to eradicate them?
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